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Abstract
This paper discusses and demonstrates the interplay
between system security and user interface conve-
nience in CAPTCHA design, and in particular, mo-
bile device CAPTCHA design. A CAPTCHA is a
computer-based security test used to distinguish hu-
man users from artiﬁcial users, preventing automated
abuse of networked resources. As mobile network
services improve, we can anticipate that future mo-
bile network services will come under attack from au-
tomated programs. Importantly, while CAPTCHA
techniques have existed for Internet services for some
time, only limited work has been carried out to es-
tablish CAPTCHAs suitable for mobile device inter-
faces. The Drawing CAPTCHA (2006) is one of the
most well known systems of this type. Unfortunately,
though it is straightforward, it is not secure. To
demonstrate this, an image-processing technique is
newly proposed that breaks the Drawing CAPTCHA.
A new CAPTCHA approach is then introduced here
which is intended speciﬁcally for mobile devices. Ex-
perimental results suggest that this new CAPTCHA
design is user-friendly as well as secure.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the development of the information
technology sector has meant that peoples day-to-day
use of the Internet has continually increased; and the
convenience of Internet services has increased in kind.
Unfortunately, abusive users such as hackers can ex-
ploit these internet resources for their own purposes
by using automated bots (simulated users) that can
reduce the performance of online systems for legit-
imate users. In order to avoid this situation, it is
important to be able to distinguish between valid hu-
man users and invalid computer bots on the Internet.
The Completely Automated Public Turing Test to
Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) was
created to meet this need. A CAPTCHA is a form of
Turing Test that distinguishes human users and com-
puter bots automatically (Pope & Kaur 2005). The
test is designed so that human users can answer any
questions or challenges easily, but computer-program
based imitators face considerably greater diﬃculty.
By considering the quality or correctness of a re-
sponse, a judging computer can determine whether
the tested user is a human or a computer bot.
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Figure 1: Example of a typical reading-based
CAPTCHA system.
This makes CAPTCHAs an interesting form of
user interface in two senses. Firstly, the CAPTCHA
interface is the essence of the application; remove the
interface and there is nothing left over. Secondly,
these interfaces attempt to optimally inconvenience
one class of users - ideally to the point where recognis-
ing or interpreting the interface is entirely intractable;
while simultaneously targeting the traditional HCI
goal of maximal convenience for regular users.
Internet-based CAPTCHAs are generally of two
forms: reading-based CAPTCHAs, and image-based
CAPTCHAs. Fig. 1 shows an example of a reading-
based CAPTCHA. This kind of CAPTCHA is usually
composed of warped English characters and Arabic
numerals, overlaid by straight or curved lines that are
generated randomly and act as image noise. The chal-
lenge is to identify the characters that are obscured by
image noise and warping, and enter them into a text
box. An automated bot has diﬃculty deciphering the
underlying characters, since until recently there have
been no character recognition techniques that can un-
derstand what the characters are in the presence of
so much noise. On the other hand, humans can an-
swer the question correctly using their natural abili-
ties when faced with the task of character recognition
in a noisy environment. Humans use innate skills such
as visual continuity and learned knowledge (e.g. fa-
miliarity with computer fonts) in order to distinguish
letters and numerals by their shapes. In the example
shown in Fig. 1, a human user could type the correct
answer “BA7WVr8TX” very easily. If a user responds
to this kind of test correctly, the system employing
the CAPTCHA test to protect its online resources
will consider the user to be human. Otherwise, the
user is considered to be potentially an automated bot;
attempts to use resources will be rejected.
Academic research into CAPTCHAs has the form
of a friendly arms race. Typically, one group of re-
searchers act as malicious users that attempt to de-
feat the latest CAPTCHA systems automatically, e.g.
(Mori & Malik 2005, Moy et al. 2004, Chellapilla et al.
2005, Chellapilla & Simard 2005). Meanwhile, an op-
posing group of researchers try to design new defen-
sive CAPTCHA techniques in response to established
or anticipated attacks (Coates et al. 2001, Hoque et al.
2006, Baird & Bentley 2005, Misra & Gaj 2006). An
eﬀective CAPTCHA system should balance the needs
of both computer security and human-friendliness.
Unfortunately, in practice, balancing these two op-
posing needs is diﬃcult (Huang et al. 2008).Figure 2: Example of the Drawing CAPTCHA for
mobile devices. The user must connect the three red
diamonds with lines, to form a triangle. A correct
solution is indicated with arrowed black lines.
Figure 3: Overview of an algorithm for breaking the
Drawing CAPTCHA.
Internet-based CAPTCHAs suitable for home PCs
are relatively mature as a technology; but there is still
a need to eﬀectively address the problem of design-
ing CAPTCHAs suitable for the hardware interface
of common mobile devices. Consequently, this paper
proposes a new form of image-based CAPTCHA in-
terface design, well-suited for mobile devices. The de-
sign utilizes the convenience of the touch-screen inter-
faces of mobile devices, and it is intended to be partic-
ularly approachable for younger or non-technical mo-
bile device users. The CAPTCHA relies on implicit
human knowledge of 3-D world objects and scenes,
and the natural ability to recognize both overlapping
images and 2-D projections of 3-D objects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the detail of the related Drawing
CAPTCHA system. Section III presents the proposed
erosion-based CAPTCHA-breaking algorithm which
operates against the Drawing CAPTCHA system.
Section IV introduces the proposed new “CAPTCHA
Zoo” scheme for mobile devices and presents our anal-
ysis. Finally, Section V provides our conclusions.
2 Related Work: The Drawing CAPTCHA
The majority of CAPTCHA techniques are designed
for use on home computers or laptops. However, in-
creasingly people are accessing network resources us-
ing smaller mobile devices as well as regular com-
puters. The development of a CAPTCHA user-
veriﬁcation mechanism suitable for mobile devices is
therefore an issue which merits research attention.
In particular, the capabilities of touch-screen user-
interfaces in mobile devices have proven very con-
venient for users. People can use their ﬁngers di-
rectly on the screen surface to handle all device oper-
ations, from dialling voice calls and browsing web-
sites to playing games and manipulating graphics.
In 2006, a CAPTCHA mechanism for mobile de-
vices was proposed in (Shirali-Shahreza et al. 2006)
which was appropriate for use on a touch-screen de-
vice, named the Drawing CAPTCHA. A Drawing
CAPTCHA is an image-based CAPTCHA whereby
users draw appropriate lines on a screen in order to
pass the CAPTCHA challenge.
Fig. 2 shows an example of a Drawing CAPTCHA
that is intended for use on a mobile phone. This
system generates a gray-colored dotted background
to begin with as an obfuscation measure against
image-processing attacks. A signiﬁcant number of
large square dots and a small number of even larger
diamond-shaped dots are then randomly drawn on
the screen. The user is asked to connect the diamond-
shaped dots. Therefore, the user must ﬁrst ﬁnd three
diamond-shaped dots; and secondly, connect them to
each other by drawing lines. There is no need to con-
nect the dots in a sequence. If a user can respond
appropriately, they are considered to be human, but
if not, they are considered to be potentially an abu-
sive automated program, and denied access.
This approach has two obvious advantages. Hu-
mans are currently considerably better able to recog-
nize visually presented shapes in the presence of noise
than computers. Secondly, the interface - drawing
lines - is well suited to the touch-screen of many 3G
mobile devices. It may be observed that it is rather
more convenient for a user to draw lines with their ﬁn-
ger or a pointing device, than enter characters using
a small virtual keyboard on the screen or using the
small set of buttons available as part of the numer-
ical keypad on most mobile devices. Unfortunately,
the shapes involved are often too small to allow conve-
nient human operation, particularly on small mobile
device screens. In addition, the shapes used (squares
and diamonds) provide clues that can allow image-
processing techniques to break the CAPTCHA. To
demonstrate this problem, this paper now proposes
an eﬀective image-processing based erosion algorithm
that breaks instances of the Drawing CAPTCHA.
3 Erosion-based Breaking Algorithm for the
Drawing CAPTCHA
The relative sizes of the diﬀerent dots within the
Drawing CAPTCHA give us useful clues that allow
us to attack it. Since the sizes of background dots
and the ‘noise/clutter’ square dots are smaller than
the diamond-shaped dots, they can be ﬁltered out by
several erosion operations. Erosion is an established
image-processing technique whereby line borders are
erased by one pixels depth per iteration. This pa-
per proposes a three-phase CAPTCHA-breaking al-
gorithm that defeats the Drawing CAPTCHA by ex-
ploiting the vulnerability of the relative size property
to erosion algorithms. Fig. 3 shows the structure of
the proposed algorithm. The ﬁrst phase involves bi-
narization, whereby the original greyscale or colored
bitmap image is transformed to a high contrast black
and white image. Next, the binarized image is trans-
formed by multiple iterations of an erosion process,
which has the eﬀect of erasing both the background
dots and also the cluttering square dots. Finally, the
labeling phase ﬁnds all of the remaining connected
components in the image and considers the largest to
be candidate diamond-shaped dots. This attack dif-
fers from Chellapilla’s attacks in three ways. Firstly,
the domain - we attack a graphical CAPTCHA rather
than a text-based CAPTCHA. Here, it is not so im-
portant to preserve ﬁne shape detail. Secondly, the
manner of attack. We do not need to engage in
enlargement or iterative dilation. Erosion by itself
rapidly isolates the diamonds. Finally, our attack
lacks OCR. A weakness of the Drawing CAPTCHA
is that the targets are simple, identical objects.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the attack against two exam-
ple CAPTCHAs. Fig. 4a shows an original Draw-
ing CAPTCHA challenge image with three diamond-
shaped dots and 100 square dots. Fig. 4b shows
the results of the ﬁrst and second phases of the pro-
posed erosion-based breaking algorithm, when three
iterations of erosion have been performed. It is easy
to see that the locations of the three largest con-
nected components in Fig. 4b are the locations of(a) Original (1). (b) Binarized & eroded.
(c) Original (2). (d) Binarized & eroded.
Figure 4: Applying the breaking algorithm to two
original Drawing CAPTCHA instances.
the diamond-shaped dots in the original image, and
the algorithm operates successfully. However, this is
not always the case. Fig. 4c gives another exam-
ple where some of the cluttering square dots have
overlapped in the bottom-right corner, resulting in
a very large connected component whose size is even
larger than that of the diamond-shaped dots - shown
in Fig. 4d. The proposed breaking algorithm does
not work successfully in the case demonstrated by the
second example. The overlapping square dots would
be incorrectly considered to be a diamond-shaped dot
by the proposed breaking algorithm. To explore the
performance of the erosion-based breaking algorithm,
another 20 instances of Drawing CAPTCHAs were
generated and attacked. Each instance contained 3
diamonds and had the form shown in the samples
above. The correct rate of identiﬁcation of diamonds
was 91% (55 of 60). 5 diamonds were not identi-
ﬁed correctly; consequently we can see that 15 of 20
sample CAPTCHAs were completely broken. This
represents a 75% breaking rate. Breaking rates of
even 10% make CAPTCHAs ineﬀective against auto-
mated attacks; consequently this attack means that
the Drawing CAPTCHA can now be considered un-
suitable for future real world use.
4 Proposed Image-based CAPTCHA
One of advantages humans possess over computers is
the capacity to recognize similar objects within im-
ages, despite various types of distortion and transfor-
mation. We utilized this property of the human visual
system in order to design a new type of CAPTCHA
interface named “CAPTCHA Zoo”, intended partic-
ularly for mobile devices and especially for younger
users of mobile devices. It operates as follows.
A challenge image is created by ﬁrst generating a
background image textured with grass to obfuscate
the image environment and make image-processing
attacks more diﬃcult. We chose this under the as-
sumption that the human visual system will be well
adapted to picking out shapes from naturally col-
ored and arranged backgrounds, such as large areas of
grass. Two visually similar kinds of animals (target
animals, to be identiﬁed by the user, and noise/clutter
animals, to obfuscate the challenge) are then ran-
domly drawn over the background. The number of
Figure 5: Example of a CAPTCHA Zoo challenge.
target animals is much smaller than the number of
noise/clutter animals. All animals are generated from
3D models with variation in color, lighting, and ro-
tation. Further, animals may overlap one another as
well as the textured background. This degree of ob-
fuscation is important, because of known weaknesses
of existing approaches.
For example, CAPTCHA techniques based on the
use of 2-D photographic imagery of animals are vul-
nerable both to dictionary attacks (i.e. there may be
a limited number of possible challenge images) and to
attacks based upon invariants (e.g. a photograph of a
cat’s face might be distinguishable by the relative po-
sition and coloration of its eyes and nose). Equally,
CAPTCHA techniques based upon presenting a ro-
tated 2-D projection of a single 3-D animal model un-
der ﬁxed lighting and colouring, and without further
visual clutter or obfuscation, might be vulnerable to
attack either by noticing points of invariance between
projections, or perhaps by reversing the 3-D rotation
transformation and matching against a known pose.
However, here, in the case where the attacker’s
problem is to recognise several parts of a varied ar-
rangement of partly-overlaid projections of 3D mod-
els, under the conditions of varying color, lighting and
rotation transforms (and potentially texture trans-
forms), in the presence of visual clutter, we note a
general solution does not presently exist. However,
most humans can solve this task very conveniently
and easily, as it is a natural skill present within the
human visual system. Animals are objects which hu-
mans are naturally well-adapted to recognize under
a variety of colourings, angles, and lighting condi-
tions, and within complex, visually cluttered environ-
ments. An essentially inﬁnite range of 2D projections,
lightings and colourings can be generated here from
a small number of models. The overlapping of the
animals with each other and with a noisy background
represents a further level of obfuscation that takes this
visual recognition problem well beyond the capacity
of demonstrated image-processing based CAPTCHA-
breaking attacks seen to date. Users are asked to
point out the locations of the target animals by press-
ing on the appropriate part of the touch screen. Fig. 5
gives a simple demonstrative example of CAPTCHA
Zoo, using dogs and horses. Here, horses are the tar-
get animal, and dogs are the noise/clutter animal in-
tended to confuse non-human users. Users pass the
test by pointing out the locations of all three horses.
As it happens, this new form of CAPTCHA is very
relevant to current themes in image-processing re-
search. Visual object recognition has become a lead-
ing research topic within image processing. In fact,
some advanced techniques have been proposed to rec-
ognize animal types in recent years, though they have
focussed primarily on 2D images such as photographs.
In 2007, Elson et. al introduced a technique with
a success rate of about 83% in distinguishing cats
and dogs (Elson et al. 2007). Although the recogni-
tion rate of that technique was high, it does not pro-Table 1: CAPTCHA Zoo usability testing results.
m 15 15 15 25 25 25 35 35 35
n 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5
Passing rate 92% 90% 89% 94% 90% 91% 97% 96% 94%
Time (seconds) 0.45 0.72 0.80 0.48 0.60 0.80 0.49 0.59 0.76
Table 2: Drawing CAPTCHA and Mobile Text CAPTCHAs usability testing results.
Drawing CAPTCHA Badongo Gimpy MSN-type Yahoo-type
Passing rate 84% 94% 94% 95% 95%
Time (seconds) 4.24 4.16 4.72 4.24 4.38
vide any leverage against this model. Breaking this
newly proposed model is much more diﬃcult; in El-
son’s work, every image only had one cat or one dog,
whereas here, every image has multiple animals of dif-
ferent types, colours and orientations, which tend to
overlap. Consequently it should be very diﬃcult for
an image-processing algorithm to isolate the target
animals from CAPTCHA Zoo images, in practice.
An experimental analysis of the properties of this
CAPTCHA was conducted using human subjects, as
follows. Let the total number of animals and the num-
ber of target animals be denoted as m and n,r e s p e c -
tively. The results of an experiment studying the ef-
fects of m and n is presented in Table 1. Three choices
of m are shown: 15, 25, or 35; and three choices of n:
3, 4, or 5. The rate of correct responses by humans
(passing rate), and the amount of time necessary for
recognition are used to measure the performance of
this new CAPTCHA type under varying parameters.
A total of 30 humans took part in this experiment as
subjects. CAPTCHA Zoo’s performance is strongly
aﬀected by the choice and combination of m and n.
Three interesting phenomena result from this ex-
periment. The ﬁrst is that when the number of total
animals is ﬁxed, i.e., the value of m is ﬁxed, a greater
value of n results in a slightly reduced passing rate.
In other words, an increase in the number of target
animals has a very small but noticeable negative ef-
fect upon the human ability to pass the CAPTCHA.
For example, when m=15, the passing rate is 92%,
90%, and 89% when the value of n is 3, 4, and 5,
respectively. There are similar results when m is 25
or 35. A much more noticeable second phenomenon
is the eﬀect upon time taken to pass the CAPTCHA
with n varying and m held constant; we see that the
time taken to pass the CAPTCHA rises dramatically
as n rises and the number of target animals to be se-
lected increases. However is not clear whether this is
due solely to the added time taken to enter the loca-
tions of target animals, or whether it is due also to
an increased diﬃculty of recognition; further analysis
would be needed to clarify this issue and unfortu-
nately this would require a new study in this case.
The third phenomenon discovered is that under the
constraint of a ﬁxed value of n,i . e . ,w h e nt h en u m b e r
of target animals is ﬁxed, the passing rate does not
decrease and the time taken does not increase as the
value of m increases. Notice that rising m and ﬁxed n
means an increase only in the number of noise/clutter
animals. Consequently, we believe that the human vi-
sual system is not perturbed by a modestly increasing
level of noise in this problem, under the tested condi-
tions. This is an interesting phenomenon, as in gen-
eral, raising the amount of noise/clutter usually has a
very negative impact upon the usability of traditional
CAPTCHAs because of the sensitivity of text charac-
ters to disruption by noise. Further study would be
needed to determine the limits of this phenomenon.
Figure 6: An example of a simpliﬁed text-based
CAPTCHA suitable for mobile devices.
5 Comparison with the Drawing CAPTCHA
and text-based CAPTCHAs.
We made an experimental comparison between
CAPTCHA Zoo, the Drawing CAPTCHA, and text-
based CAPTCHA challenges. We had found that ex-
isting text CAPTCHA systems presented in a web
browser were awkward for users to select, zoom and
respond to. We therefore invented an appropriate
text CAPTCHA interface for mobile devices, which
we used in combination with the obfuscation styles
of several famous text CAPTCHA systems to try to
enable fair comparison between the diﬀerent types of
CAPTCHA.
This Mobile Text CAPTCHA system has the fol-
lowing format: a four character text CAPTCHA con-
taining a randomly chosen restricted range of case-
insensitive characters, with a reduced-alphabet on-
screen keyboard integrated into the CAPTCHA itself
to simplify user text entry (some onscreen keyboards
would overlap the challenge image). The security of
such a CAPTCHA is less than that of a traditional
desktop PC text CAPTCHA because of the reduced
length and alphabet. However, we feel the increased
suitability of this interface for a mobile screen allows
a fairer comparison of usability between text-based
CAPTCHAs and CAPTCHA-Zoo. An example chal-
lenge is shown in Fig. 6.
Our Mobile Text CAPTCHA interface was used
with samples representing each of four well known
text systems (Badongo, Gimpy, MSN, Yahoo).
Five challenges and 55 users were tested for each
CAPTCHA system. The Drawing CAPTCHA was
also tested during the same experiment. Table 2 in-
dicates the results.
The passing rates for CAPTCHA-Zoo and the Mo-
bile Text CAPTCHA are similar; but the time taken
to pass a CAPTCHA-Zoo challenge appears to be
noticeably smaller. However, we expect there may
be more eﬀective ways to present text CAPTCHAs
for mobile devices than the Mobile Text CAPTCHAwe suggest here. We also found that the Drawing
CAPTCHA has longer average responses times than
CAPTCHA Zoo and a lower passing rate.
6 Conclusions
This paper has made two main contributions. The
ﬁrst is the proposal of an erosion-based CAPTCHA-
breaking algorithm that successfully attacks the
Drawing CAPTCHA for mobile devices. The sec-
ond is a new CAPTCHA system for mobile devices
(and particularly for younger users of mobile devices)
called CAPTCHA Zoo, which is based on the parame-
terized 2D projection of 3D models of natural animals
onto a natural background. This second contribution
represents a challenge for automated bot agents that
we feel is presently insurmountable by CAPTCHA-
breaking techniques. CAPTCHA Zoo has been shown
experimentally to be convenient for humans even un-
der varying parameters. These contributions improve
the security of online systems that are accessed by mo-
bile devices without having a negative impact upon
the usability or accessibility of such systems. We hope
the results of this research will discourage attacks on
systems accessed by mobile devices, and will open
some new avenues for research into CAPTCHA inter-
faces that are suitable for mobile devices.
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